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The Restatements and the Rule of Law
Kristina Daugirdas

In drafting and publishing Restatements of the Law of Foreign Relations, both
the American Law Institute and the reporters have understood the projects as
contributing to the rule of law at the international level, at the domestic level, or
both. Herbert Wechsler described 1965—the year that the first such Restatement
was published—as a time “when the maintenance and development of law in the
governance of international relationships increasingly engages the attention and
the hopes of all mankind.”1 This publication was formally captioned the Second
Restatement, as others have explained.2 Some twenty years later, when a comprehensive revision—the Third Restatement—was published, the introduction
returned to and elaborated on this theme. The Restatement should be understood as a “reaffirmation” of the role of law along two dimensions: “Relations between nations are not anarchic; they are governed by law”; so too are “Presidents,
members of Congress, and public officials when they conduct the foreign relations of the United States.”3 Finally, the recently published Fourth Restatement
reiterated the point that “this project is a reaffirmation of the rule of law.”4
It is easy to cheer promotion of the rule of law. Indeed, reaffirmations of the
rule of law seem especially welcome, even urgent, at this historical moment,
when the president of the United States has repeatedly manifested disdain for
legal rules and legal institutions, national and international alike. But, as is often
the case when it comes to slogans that garner widespread endorsement, things
are more complicated than they initially appear. This chapter surfaces some of

1 Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States intro. at vii
(Am. Law Inst. 1965).
2 Sarah H. Cleveland & Paul B. Stephan, Introduction: The Roles of the Restatements in U.S. Foreign
Relations Law, in this volume.
3 Third Restatement intro. at 5.
4 Fourth Restatement intro. at 2. The Introduction continues: “Responsible officials—
domestic, foreign, and international alike—face legal constraints on their choices in the conduct of
foreign relations. Particular rules may demand revision in the face of changes in international relations and the world economy, but the fundamental importance of the rule of law remains beyond
question. This Restatement, as much as the work of our distinguished predecessors, seeks to direct
attention to law as a means of expressing, supporting, and reinforcing the decisions that make up international relations.” Id.
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the tensions that are built into the project of reaffirming or promoting the rule
of law.
To start, there are at least three distinct ways that Restatements of foreign relations law might promote the rule of law. First, they might do so by clarifying the
content of the law. With respect to international law, which is largely unfamiliar
to a significant fraction of the Restatement’s audience, clarifying content involves
both explaining the sources of international law and identifying specific rules.
As Thomas Franck has observed, rules that are clear are generally perceived to be
more legitimate, in part because, when rules are clear, they are easier to follow—
and violations are easier to identify.5
Second, the Restatements might contribute to the development of new legal
rules—specifically to the evolution and consolidation of customary international
law.6 Of course, as a formal matter, the American Law Institute lacks the authority
to promulgate new rules of international law. But the Restatement nevertheless
has significant capacity to influence their development. When U.S. courts rely on
the Restatement for an articulation of a rule of customary international law and
apply it, the resulting opinions supply data points that are relevant to assessing
the existence and content of such rules. As the audience for the Restatement
extends beyond the borders of the United States, the Restatement can also influence the practice and opinio juris of other states as well.
Clarification of the law always involves some degree of development of the
law. As a result, contributing to the development of new rules of international
law is, at least to some degree, inevitable. Of course, the greater the degree of
development, the more controversial the exercise. Efforts to nudge the development of the law can backfire, leaving the authors vulnerable to charges that they
are engaged in advocacy and that they are undermining the credibility of the
Restatement as a restatement—and of customary international law as a source
of law.7

5 Thomas Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations 55–83 (1990); cf. Frederick
Schauer, Official Obedience and the Politics of Defining Law, 86 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1165, 1190, 1992
(2013) (arguing that clear rules are especially important when courts or other formal institutions for
adjudicating disputes are unavailable).
6 Karl M. Meessen, Conflicts of Jurisdiction and the New Restatement, 50 L. & Contemp. Probs.
47, 53 (1987) (“[T]oday’s lex ferenda might be tomorrow’s lex lata if only due to the impact of the
Restatement itself.”).
7 See, e.g., David B. Massey, How the ALI Influences CIL, 22 Yale J. Int’l L. 419 (1997) (“The usefulness of the entire Restatement diminishes when the accuracy of one of its key sections is called
into question. Judges and practitioners who rely on the Restatement because of its user-friendliness
will do so only as long as they perceive that it is authoritative.”); W.T. Burke, Customary Law of the
Sea: Advocacy or Disinterested Scholarship?, 14 Yale J. Int’l L. 508, 527 (1989) (“Expanding the rule
of law in international affairs is unquestionably worthy and important, but it is not a service to that
goal for allegedly objective observers to endorse official views about customary law irrespective of
the amount or probity of the evidence supporting those views.”).
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Finally, the Restatements might promote the rule of law by promoting compliance with the law. In a variety of ways, U.S. courts have the potential to play an
important role in promoting compliance with international law, by the United
States and by other actors if they are subject to suit in U.S. courts.8 Separately,
the Restatements of Foreign Relations Law might provoke or support action
by foreign governments or other actors abroad that promotes compliance with
international law.9
The Third and Fourth Restatements have taken quite different approaches to
promoting the rule of law. To some extent these different approaches are a consequence of changes in the legal landscape over the past three decades. They also
reflect different choices that the reporters and the American Law Institute have
made about how to carry out the project of restating foreign relations law.
Part I identifies some developments in U.S. case law since the publication
of the Third Restatement that have rendered the promotion of the rule of law
a more complicated task. While the United States remains a “semi-monist”
system,10 during that interlude, the United States moved closer to the dualist end
of the spectrum. These steps were not inevitable—in fact, some of them were
quite controversial. Regardless, these developments have begun to drive a wedge
between promoting the rule of domestic law and promoting compliance with
international law.
Part II turns to the diverging approaches of the Third and Fourth Restatements
with respect to articulating rules of customary international law. The Third
Restatement is notably quick—according to some critics, too quick—to articulate rules of customary international law. In doing so, the reporters of the Third
Restatement were quite willing to disagree with the views of the U.S. government. By contrast, the Fourth Restatement is more reticent on both fronts. The
approach taken by the Fourth Restatement avoids some of the downsides of that
taken by its predecessor, but also forfeits some of the advantages.
Part III argues that future installments of the Fourth Restatement ought to
promote the rule of international law by updating and expanding the sections
of the Third Restatement that address the architecture of international law on
two key issues: international responsibility and the evolution of customary international law over time. The Fourth Restatement need not directly exhort
litigants and judges to comply with international law. But by providing this basic

8 This capacity is by no means limited to U.S. courts; it is shared by all national courts. See André
Nollkaemper, National Courts and the International Rule of Law (2011).
9 See, e.g., Karl M. Meessen, Foreword to Special Review Essays: The Restatement (Third) of Foreign
Relations of the United States, 14 Yale J. Int’l L. 433, 435 (1989) (“[I]n disputes with the U.S. government, foreign governments can be expected to rely on the Restatement whenever it supports their
case.”).
10 Cleveland & Stephan, supra note 2.
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information about the international legal system, the Restatement would wave a
caution flag and encourage courts to take the procedural steps that would avoid
unwitting (and potentially deleterious) engagement with international law.

I. Promoting International vs. Domestic Rule of Law
When it comes to implementing the United States’ treaty obligations, the
reporters for the Fourth Restatement confronted a legal landscape that looked
quite different from that faced by the reporters for the Third Restatement. This
section describes two Supreme Court decisions that have created tension between the promotion of international and domestic rule of law. They don’t make
it impossible to do both simultaneously, but—especially in combination—they
do make it make it harder, and therefore less likely.
First, there was the Supreme Court’s 2008 decision in Medellín v. Texas.11
The case concerned a decision by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) about
the required remedy for the United States’ breach of the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations (VCCR). Pursuant to Article 36 of the VCCR, the United
States has an obligation to inform foreign nationals arrested in the United States
that they have a right of access to their consular officials.12 Implementation of
this obligation was spotty at best, and no one so informed José Ernesto Medellín
when he was arrested for murder in Texas. Medellín was subsequently convicted
and sentenced to death. On behalf of Medellín and a number of other individuals, Mexico pursued action against the United States before the ICJ, which ruled
that, as a consequence of this breach, the United States was obliged to permit
“review and reconsideration” of these individuals’ cases to ascertain whether the
breach of Article 36 “caused actual prejudice to the defendant in the process of
administration of criminal justice.”13
There was no doubt that the United States had an international obligation to
comply with this decision.14 The problem was that Texas law precluded such review and reconsideration. If the ICJ’s decision were self-executing, Texas law
would have to give way.
The black-letter provisions of the Third Restatement suggest that, as a default matter, international agreements are self-executing. Section 111 provides
that such agreements are non-self-executing only if “the agreement manifests an
11

552 U.S. 491 (2008).
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, art. 36(1)(b), Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596
U.N.T.S. 261.
13 Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), Merits, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. 1
(Mar. 31), para. 121.
14 Medellín, 552 U.S. at 504.
12
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intention that it shall not become effective as domestic law without the enactment
of the implementing legislation,” “if the Senate in giving consent to a treaty, or
Congress by resolution, requires implementing legislation,” or “if implementing
legislation is constitutionally required.”15 A reporters’ note explains that “compliance is facilitated and expedited” where treaties are self-executing.16 Thus, “if
the Executive Branch has not requested implementing legislation and Congress
has not enacted such legislation, there is a strong presumption that the treaty has
been considered self-executing by the political branches, and should be considered self-executing by the courts.”17
The approach taken by the Supreme Court in Medellín diverged from that
prescribed by the Third Restatement. Instead of looking for evidence that ICJ
judgments were not meant to be self-executing, the Supreme Court engaged in
a search for affirmative indications that ICJ judgments were intended to be self-
executing, and did not find them.18 Moreover, the Court appeared untroubled by
the risk of noncompliance with international law. Instead, the Court was anxious
to preserve the option of violating international law: The Court did not want to
“undermin[e]the ability of the political branches to determine whether and how
to comply with an ICJ judgment.”19
Ultimately, the Court concluded that the ICJ’s decision was not self-executing.
In doing so, the Court raised the costs of compliance with treaty obligations.
The federal government could try to cajole states into compliance, but in the
wake of Medellín, those efforts repeatedly failed to deliver results.20 In theory,
Congress could still enact federal legislation to require review and reconsideration. In practice, Congress did not.21 This omission is no great surprise: inaction in Congress is overdetermined. Had the Supreme Court’s opinion gone the
other way, noncompliance with an ICJ decision would remain possible. But the
default would be set to compliance, and a president who wanted to disregard an
ICJ opinion would have to secure legislation requiring or permitting this course
of action.
While Medellín insisted that implementing legislation was the solution for
implementing non-self-executing treaties, a decision that followed several years
later, Bond v. United States, made this solution harder to obtain. In particular,
15

Third Restatement § 111(4) (emphasis added).
Id. reporters’ note 5.
17 Id.
18 Medellín, 552 U.S. at 517 (“Given that ICJ judgments may interfere with state procedural rules,
one would expect the ratifying parties to the relevant treaties to have clearly stated their intent to give
hose judgments domestic effect, if they had so intended. Here there is no [such] statement. . . .”).
19 Id. at 510–11.
20 Kristina Daugirdas & Julian Davis Mortenson, Another Mexican National Executed in Texas in
Defiance of Avena Decision, 108 Am. J. Int’l L. 322 (2014).
21 Id.
16
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Bond made it harder to enact implementing legislation that would comprehensively implement certain treaty obligations—specifically those that address
matters that have been traditionally regulated by state governments. In this way,
Bond further increased the obstacles to complying with treaty obligations.
Bond concerns a challenge to the constitutionality of the Chemical Weapons
Convention Implementation Act. As the statute’s title suggests, it was enacted
to implement the United States’ obligations as a party to the Chemical Weapons
Convention. That treaty prohibits States Parties from using chemical weapons
“under any circumstances,”22 and separately imposes an obligation on states parties
to enact legislation that would prohibit individuals from “undertaking any activity
prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.”23 Accordingly, Section 229 of the
implementing legislation includes a provision that forbids, among other things, the
possession or use by any person of “any chemical weapon.”24 Both the treaty and the
legislation define “chemical weapons” as toxic chemicals and their precursors, except where the chemicals are intended for industrial, agricultural, and certain other
narrowly defined uses.25 And both the treaty and the legislation define “toxic chemical” as “any chemical which through its chemical action on life processes can cause
death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals.”26
Federal prosecutors had charged Carol Anne Bond with two counts of
possessing and using a chemical weapon pursuant to this statute.27 Bond, a microbiologist, had sought to poison her former friend, Myrlinda Hanes, upon
learning that Hanes was pregnant—and that Bond’s husband was the father.28
Apparently hoping that Haynes would “develop an uncomfortable rash,” Bond
spread the chemicals on Haynes’s car door, mailbox, and doorknob.29 Haynes
was largely able to avoid the chemicals, and suffered only a “minor chemical burn
on her thumb.”30
This unlikely set of facts laid the groundwork for the Supreme Court to reconsider the scope of Congress’s authority to implement treaties under the necessary
and proper clause. Bond argued that Section 229 exceeded Congress’s enumerated authorities under the Constitution. The U.S. government had disavowed
the interstate commerce clause as a source of authority.31 As a result, Bond’s
22 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of
Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, art. I, ¶ 1(b), S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-21, 1974 U.N.T.S.
317 [hereinafter CWC].
23 Id. art. VII, ¶ 1(a).
24 18 U.S.C. § 229(a)(1).
25 CWC art. II(1)(a); art. II(9)(a); 18 U.S.C. § 229F(1)(A); 229F(7).
26 CWC art. II(2); 18 U.S.C. 229F(8)(A).
27 Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 852 (2014).
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Bond, 572 U.S. at 854–55.
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challenge set the stage for the Supreme Court to revisit Missouri v. Holland, the
1920 case in which the Supreme Court held that “[i]f the treaty is valid there can
be no dispute about the validity” of the implementing legislation “as a necessary
and proper means to execute the powers of the Government.”32
Two Justices were ready and willing to overturn Missouri v. Holland.33 The
majority, however, was not. Instead, the majority interpreted the statute as not
reaching Bond’s conduct. Reading the Implementation Act to reach a “purely
local crime[]” like Bond’s would intrude on the police power of the States, according to the majority. The Court declined to do so in the absence of a clear
statement from Congress that the legislation was meant to reach such conduct.
In this way, the majority avoided reaching the constitutional challenge.
The majority opinion suggested that—unlike in Medellín—the United States’
international obligations were not in play. Chief Justice Roberts wrote: “[T]here
are no apparent interests of the United States Congress or the community of nations in seeing Bond end up in federal prison, rather than dealt with (like virtually
all other criminals in Pennsylvania) by the State.”34 In making this observation,
Roberts relied on the Solicitor General’s statement during oral argument that it
was unlikely that the failure to prosecute Ms. Bond would “give rise to an international incident.”35 Perhaps this characterization was a strategic choice on
the part of the executive branch to downplay the risk of a breach (more on this
later).36 But “not giv[ing] rise to an international incident” is not the same thing
as saying the United States’ compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention
was not at risk. And, indeed, an amicus brief filed by several former diplomats
who negotiated the Chemical Weapons Convention argued forcefully that the
treaty’s prohibitions did reach Bond’s conduct.37 Moreover, they explained,
the United States could not fulfill its obligations under the Chemical Weapons
Convention by relying on State criminal laws:
The CWC requires states parties to enact criminal prohibitions that apply not
only to use of chemical weapons but also development, manufacture, possession, and transfer—acts that State law generally leaves unregulated. Even if
all 50 States could be persuaded to enact compliant implementing legislation,

32

Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920).
See Bond, 572 U.S. at 873–82 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas joined this dissent.
Bond, 572 U.S. at 865.
35 Id.
36 See infra text accompanying note 109.
37 Brief of Amici Curiae Chemical Weapons Convention Negotiators and Experts in Support of
Respondent, Bond v. United States, 2013 WL 4518601 (2013), at *16 (“In this case, the plain text,
structure and context of the CWC make clear, and the travaux confirm, that the CWC’s prohibitions
reach Bond’s conduct.”).
33

34

534

VI. The Restatement’s Futures

the laws must apply not only within the country but to U.S. nationals located
abroad.38

Importantly, the effects of the Supreme Court’s decision in Bond were not confined to implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention. The United States is
party to a number of other treaties that require the United States to enact particular domestic penal regimes, including treaties related to biological and nuclear
weapons and to hostage-taking.39 A number of other treaties likewise require
action on “local” matters in order to comply, including the Hague Convention
on Civil Aspects of Child Abduction and the Convention on Road Traffic.40 After
Bond, the legislation that implements these treaties is vulnerable to challenge.
The Fourth Restatement takes a cautious approach to characterizing both
Medellín and Bond, and is careful not to overstate their holdings. In fact, the
Fourth Restatement may understate the extent to which Medellín reflected
a change from past practice. The black-letter text on evaluating whether a
treaty provision is self-executing retains the Third Restatement’s references
to the Senate’s views and to constitutionally required implementing legislation; it also provides that “Courts will evaluate whether the text and context
of the provision, along with other treaty materials, are consistent with an understanding by the U.S. treatymakers that the provision would be directly enforceable in courts in the United States.”41 In a comment that follows, the Fourth
Restatement elaborates that while “[m]odern practice has made inquiry into
self-execution more routine,” the case law “has not established a general presumption for or against self-execution, in the sense of a clear statement or default
rule that dictates a result in the absence of contrary evidence.”42 It is true that
Medellín didn’t expressly establish a presumption against self-execution, but—
as a reporters’ note acknowledges43—some lower courts have characterized it as
doing so. Such a characterization is, at a minimum, entirely plausible in light of
the Court’s demanding search for affirmative indications of self-execution. The
establishment of a de facto presumption against self-execution is all the more
plausible in light of Justice Breyer’s observation that such affirmative evidence is
unlikely to be found, at least in the context of multilateral treaties, in light of the
range of national practices with respect to incorporating treaty provisions into
domestic law.44
38

Id. at *4.
Id. at *34; Brief of Former State Department Legal Advisers as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondent, Bond v. United States, 2013 WL 4518602 (2013), at *23–*24.
40 Brief of Former State Department Legal Advisers as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent,
Bond v. United States, 2013 WL 4518602 (2013).
41 Fourth Restatement § 310.
42 Id. § 310 cmt. d.
43 Id. § 310 reporters’ note 3.
44 Medellín, 552 U.S. at 552.
39
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Likewise, the Fourth Restatement avoids anticipating how the Supreme
Court might build on these cases in the future. Thus, for example, the Fourth
Restatement follows the lead of the majority in Bond and does not address the
vulnerability of Missouri v. Holland to future challenges.45 Instead, the Fourth
Restatement reiterates Missouri’s holding in black letter.46
All that said, it may well be the case that the Supreme Court will drive a
bigger wedge between national and international law in years to come. Since
Medellín and Bond were decided, the Court’s composition has changed. On the
D.C. Circuit, now-Justice Kavanaugh went out of his way to reject international
law as relevant to either statutory or constitutional interpretation. In Al-Bihani
v. Obama, he wrote a concurrence that rejected the Charming Betsy canon of
interpretation47 with respect to non-self-executing treaties and customary international law.48 In Bahlul v. United States, he wrote another concurrence that
dismissed as “extraordinary”—in other words, implausible, if not ridiculous—
an argument that Congress has the constitutional authority to establish military commissions only for offenses recognized by the international law of war.49
Justice Gorsuch’s views regarding international law remain unknown. As a
Tenth Circuit judge, he wrote almost nothing about international law or foreign
affairs.50

II. Clarifying the Content of Customary International Law
When it comes to customary international law, the Restatements agree on the appropriate methodology for ascertaining such rules, at least as a formal matter. In
this sense, the legal landscape has not shifted over the past thirty years. The Third
Restatement supplies a definition of customary international law that closely
tracks—and arguably even improves on—that found in Article 38 of the Statute
of the International Court of Justice. Section 102 explains that “[c]ustomary

45

Fourth Restatement § 312 cmt. e & reporters’ note 5.
Id. § 312(2) (“Congress has constitutional authority to enact legislation that is necessary and
proper to implement treaties, even if such legislation would otherwise fall outside of Congress’s legislative authority.”).
47 Section 406 of the Fourth Restatement articulates the Charming Betsy canon of construction
in the context of jurisdiction to prescribe: “Where fairly possible, courts in the United States construe federal statutes to avoid conflict with international law governing jurisdiction to prescribe.” For
further discussion of the Restatement’s treatment of the canon, see Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford
R. Clark, Restating The Charming Betsy as a Canon of Avoidance, in this volume.
48 619 F.3d 1, 9–11 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
49 840 F.3d 757, 759–63 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
50 Congressional Research Service, Judge Neil M. Gorsuch: His Jurisprudence and Potential
Impact on the Supreme Court 85 & n.685 (2017), available at https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44778.
pdf.
46
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international law results from a general and consistent practice of states followed
by them from a sense of legal obligation.”51 The next section elaborates on evidence of international law. For customary international law, the “ ‘best evidence’
is proof of state practice, ordinarily by reference to official documents and other
indications of government action” while for international agreements, the key
evidence is the “text of the agreement, but appropriate supplementary means to
its interpretation are not excluded.”52 Thus, the Third Restatement’s black-letter
description of the secondary rules regarding customary international law hews
to a traditional, positivist approach.53
The Fourth Restatement does not (yet) include a comparable introduction
to the international legal system. Nevertheless, scattered in comments and
reporters’ notes is an affirmation of the same methodology for identifying rules
of customary international law. Thus, for example, a comment following Section
401, which introduces categories of jurisdiction, explains that customary international law “results from a general and consistent practice of states followed out
of a sense of international legal right or obligation.”54 A later comment explains
that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) “and cases applying it may
also contribute to the content, interpretation, and development of international
law. Judicial decisions and domestic legislation, if enacted or decided out of a
sense of international legal obligation, constitute state practice and evidence of
opinio juris, the two elements of customary international law.”55
Notwithstanding their parallel descriptions of the elements of customary international law, the Restatements take quite different approaches to identifying
such rules. The Third Restatement does not shy away from articulating rules of
customary international law on a wide range of topics. Its reporters seemed to
embrace the status of that Restatement as a subsidiary means for identifying rules
of customary international law.56 In identifying such rules, the reporters for the
Third Restatement disagreed, sometimes quite vehemently, with the positions
taken by the U.S. government with respect to such rules.57 Indeed, a number of
51

Third Restatement § 102(2).
Id. § 103.
53 Anthea Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International Law: A
Reconciliation, 95 Am. J. Int’l L. 757 (2001).
54 Fourth Restatement § 401 cmt. a.
55 Id.; see also id. § 402 cmt. c (explaining why actions and decisions based on international comity
are not evidence of what customary international law requires).
56 Third Restatement § 103 reporters’ note 1.
57 See id. Foreword at ix (“In a number of particulars the formulations in this Restatement are at
variance with positions that have been taken by the United States Government.”); The Restatement of
Foreign Relations Law of the United States, Revised: How Were the Controversies Resolved?, 81 Proc.
Am. Soc’y Int’l L. 180, 184 (1987) (remarks of Detlev Vagts) (“While in our last round we adjusted
quite a few things to meet government objections, particularly of The Legal Adviser of the State
Department, we didn’t change our view of the law. There are some things in there that The Legal
Adviser does not like.”).
52
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participants described the process of drafting the Third Restatement as rife with
tension between the reporters, the American Law Institute, and the U.S. executive branch.58
Reviews of the Third Restatement’s analysis of customary international law
were mixed.59 Among the criticisms that emerged, one common theme was that
the reporters were too quick to claim the status of customary international for
the rules that they articulated: They did so with what was, at best, a cursory review of evidence of practice and opinio juris.60
A comment following Section 103’s discussion of evidence of customary international law suggests the reporters deliberately established a lower evidentiary threshold for certain rules: “A determination as to whether a customary
rule has developed is likely to be influenced by assessment as to whether the rule
will contribute to international order.”61 As drafted, this sentence could be taken
as descriptive—as meaning something like: Notwithstanding the black-letter
rules, one can observe that tribunals and others take this consideration into account. The sentence could also be read as taking a normative position endorsing
the appropriateness of this consideration. Employing a laxer approach to evaluating evidence for desirable rules (in the eyes of the reporters and the American
Law Institute) is one way that the Third Restatement might seek to promote the
rule of international law.
Indeed, by influencing judges and other actors at home and abroad, the Third
Restatement’s contestable assertions that certain rules had already attained the
status of customary international law could become self-fulfilling prophecies.
Precisely because collecting and analyzing evidence of customary international

58 See The Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, Revised: How Were the
Controversies Resolved?, 81 Proc. Am. Soc’y Int’l L. 180, 181 (1987) (remarks of Harold Maier)
(noting the “unusually vituperative controversy that accompanied the development, promulgation,
and eventual adoption” of the Third Restatement).
59 Massey, supra note 7, at 423–24 (collecting and summarizing reviews).
60 See, e.g., Burke, supra note 7, at 509 (arguing that the Restatement “mistreats” customary international law by “declaring that some principles have that quality when there is no evidence that
customary international law has anything effective to say on the matter; second, by declaring unqualified customary law principles when the evidence of state practice is unclear at best; and finally,
by identifying principles as customary law which are supported only by distorted and misleading
characterizations of sources.”); David Caron, The Law of the Environment: A Symbolic Step of Modest
Value, 14 Yale J. Int’l L. 528, 534 (1989) (“The legal propositions in these sections [on transfrontier
pollution] are sometimes conservative, sometimes progressive, and almost always stated with
too much conviction. The recurring certainty with which propositions are stated in Part VI gives
an impression of overall stability to this area of law that is unwarranted, if not inappropriate.”);
The Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, Revised: How Were the Controversies
Resolved?, 81 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 180, 192 (1987) (remarks of Monroe Leigh) (“This brings me
to my first general criticism of the new Restatement—that the Reporters have been a bit too prone,
perhaps we can say too willful, to finding new customary international law.”).
61 Third Restatement § 103, cmt. a.
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law is difficult and resource-intensive, judges and other actors rely on sources
like the Restatement without undertaking an independent analysis.62
At the same time, allowing such normative considerations to infuse analyses
of customary international law is risky. It could invite unflattering assessments of
the reporters’ motivations.63 More consequentially, such a normatively infused
approach could disserve the goal of promoting the rule of law by fueling skepticism about customary international law as a source of law.64 On what basis
should, or could, the world possibly be bound by the subjective assessment of the
American Law Institute about which rules conduce to the global good?
By contrast to the Third Restatement, the Fourth approaches customary international law with greater humility, reflecting the view that a rigorous analysis of practice and opinio juris is genuinely difficult. In the area of immunity,
one reporter explained that uncovering the practice of foreign states was challenging: “Many states have not codified their rules of state immunity, and in
many of these states, the courts have not been require to address the full range
of issues that are addressed by the FSIA.”65 Identifying opinio juris was likewise
difficult: “Even when there is a controlling statutory provision or judicial decision, it can be challenging to determine whether the particular rule is followed
out of a sense of international legal obligation or whether the foreign country has
extended or curtailed immunity beyond what may legitimately be viewed as the
requirements of customary international law.”66
At the same time, unlike the Third Restatement, the Fourth reflects a more
collaborative approach with the U.S. government. In fact, one reporter described
the reporters as “trying assiduously to avoid finding ourselves in a box where we
are declaring, based on our understanding of international law, that U.S. practice
might be inconsistent with international law.”67 An example cited in this volume
by the chief reporters is the Fourth Restatement’s handling of “tag” jurisdiction.68
Faced with a conflict between U.S. practice and the customary international law
62 Cf. David D. Caron, The ILC Articles on State Responsibility: The Paradoxical Relationship
between Form and Authority, 96 Am. J. Int’l L. 857, 866–68 (2002) (expressing the concern that
arbitrators would “defer too easily and uncritically” to apparently neutral external sources describing
rules of customary international law like the draft articles on state responsibility).
63 Monroe Leigh, supra note 60, at 192 (suggesting that international lawyers in general are susceptible to “the addiction of declaring that a favorite proposition of law has now become customary
international law and is therefore binding on everybody. Especially if the favorite proposition is close
to the goal line of acceptance, international lawyers, in their writings, in their decisions, and even in
restatements such as this, find it difficult to resist the temptation to nudge that favorite proposition
across the goal line and into the end zone of customary international law.”).
64 Burke, supra note 7, at 527.
65 Perspectives on the Restatement (Fourth) Project, 109 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 209, 212 (2015)
(remarks by William S. Dodge).
66 Id.
67 Id. (remarks by Paul B. Stephan).
68 Cleveland & Stephan, supra note 2.
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rule articulated by the Third Restatement, the Fourth Restatement refrains from
addressing the latter.69

A. Prescriptive Jurisdiction
The Third and Fourth Restatements’ respective handling of prescriptive jurisdiction illustrates their diverging approaches to customary international law—as
well as the risks and advantages of those diverging approaches.
The Third Restatement garnered significant attention—at the time of publication and subsequently—for declaring that customary international law imposes
a requirement of reasonableness on exercises of prescriptive jurisdiction. In particular, after setting out the accepted bases of prescriptive jurisdiction,70 Section
403 explains that an exercise of jurisdiction is “nonetheless unlawful if it is unreasonable.”71 To structure the analysis of this question, the Third Restatement
sets out a list of eight factors to consider when evaluating reasonableness.72
Among these factors were “the extent to which another states may have an interest in regulating the activity” and the “likelihood of conflict with regulation by
another state.”73
Louis Henkin, the Chief Reporter for the Third Restatement, explained that,
in drafting this section, the reporters
tried to combine what American courts have done in developing this balancing
and these standards, and foreign objections to what they call extravagant and
exorbitant exercises of jurisdiction—combining those two approaches into a
principle of international law which we think our courts would accept, and has
a good chance of being accepted by the people abroad as a restatement of what
they are doing.74

The executive branch objected to Henkin’s approach as a matter of both law and
policy. In the view of the State Department Legal Adviser, Section 403 neither
accurately reflected international law nor did it “constitute a desirable change in
the law.”75

69

Id.
Third Restatement § 402.
71 Id. § 403 & cmt. a.
72 Id. § 403(2).
73 Id.
74 Thursday Morning Session, May 21, 1981, 58 Am. L. Inst. Proc. 255, 262 (1981).
75 Davis R. Robinson, Conflicts of Jurisdiction and the Draft Restatement, 15 Law & Pol’y Int’l
Bus. 1149, 1152 (1983) (describing the opinion of the Office of the Legal Adviser).
70
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Of course, even if the Third Restatement was wrong about the status of the reasonableness requirement at the moment that it was published, it could become
right over time. Within the United States, the reasonableness rule did get some
traction. Justice Scalia, writing a dissent on behalf of four Justices in Hartford
Fire Insurance v. California, relied on Section 403’s characterization of customary
international law to interpret the extraterritorial reach of the Sherman Act.76 In
2004, the Supreme Court decided another antitrust case in line with the reasonableness requirement. The Court wrote that it “ordinarily construes ambiguous
statutes to avoid unreasonable interference with the sovereign authority of other
nations,” and observed that this “rule of construction reflects principles of customary international law—law that (we must assume) Congress ordinarily seeks
to follow.”77 A handful of lower courts likewise relied on Section 403.78
In at least one instance, the State Department itself adopted the Third
Restatement’s characterization of the reasonableness requirement as part of customary international law. Communicating with Congress, the Legal Adviser’s
Office objected to certain proposed sanctions on the grounds that “international
law . . . requires a state to apply is laws to extraterritorial conduct only when
doing so would be reasonable in view of certain customary factors.”79
Ultimately, however, neither the U.S. executive branch nor foreign
governments endorsed the reasonableness requirement, and most scholars of international law remained unpersuaded that the reasonableness requirement was
part of customary international law.80
Reflecting these developments, the Fourth Restatement departs from the
Third in delineating permissible exercises of prescriptive jurisdiction:
Customary international law permits exercises of prescriptive jurisdiction if
there is a genuine connection between the subject of the regulation and the
state seeking to regulate. The genuine connection usually rests on a specific
connection between the state and the subject being regulated, such as territory,
effects, active personality, passive personality, or protection. In the case of universal jurisdiction, the genuine connection rests on the universal concern of
states in suppressing certain offenses.81

76

Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 818–19 (1993).
F. Hoffmann-La Roche v. Empagran, 542 U.S. 155, 164 (2004).
Massey, supra note 7, at 437–39.
79 Id. at 439.
80 See, e.g., Phillip R. Trimble, The Supreme Court and International Law: The Demise of
Restatement Section 403, 89 Am. J. Int’l L. 53, 55 (1995); Cedric Ryngaert, Jurisdiction in
International Law 178–79 (2008). But see Hannah Buxbaum & Ralf Michaels, Reasonableness as a
Limitation on the Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Law: From 403 to 405 (via 404), in this volume.
81 Fourth Restatement § 407.
77
78
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Reasonableness isn’t entirely irrelevant to this inquiry, the Fourth Restatement
explains: “Reasonableness, in the sense of showing a genuine connection, is an
important touchstone for determining whether an exercise of jurisdiction is permissible under international law.”82 But, the Fourth Restatement continues,
state practice does not support a requirement of case-by-case balancing to
establish reasonableness as a matter of international law. . . . Nor does international law require a state with a legitimate basis for asserting prescriptive jurisdiction to refrain from exercising such jurisdiction because another state has
a stronger interest in exercising jurisdiction.83

One might view the demise of the reasonableness requirement as confirmation
of the problematic nature of the Third Restatement’s approach to customary international law. In my view, however, this assessment misses the value added
by the Third Restatement, which was wrong in a constructive way. Even if the
reasonableness rule articulated by the Third Restatement was not supported by
widespread practice and evidence of opinio juris, the reasonableness rule did reflect a good-faith effort to assimilate the practice of U.S. courts and the protests
of foreign governments. The rule that the Third Restatement articulated supplied
a focal point to which courts, scholars, and governments could react. Article
38(1)(d) of the ICJ Statute affirms that “the teachings of the most highly qualified
publicists of the various nations” constitute a “subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.” Such “teachings” are worth consulting not because they
are infallible, but because they can reflect good-faith efforts to collect and analyze the data points that supply evidence of customary international law.

B. The Terrorism Exceptions to the FSIA
The terrorism exceptions to the FSIA resulted from a series of amendments
to that statute permitting lawsuits and facilitating enforcement of judgments
against states that the U.S. executive branch had designated sponsors of terrorism. The consistency with international law of the terrorism exceptions is
questionable: The exceptions have elicited protests from foreign governments.
For example, in 2016, the Coordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Movement
issued a communiqué protesting the United States’ unilateral waiver of sovereign
immunity:

82
83

Id. § 407 reporters’ note 3.
Id.
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This practice runs counter to the most fundamental principles of international
law, in particular the principle of sovereign immunity as one of the cornerstones
of the international legal order and a rule of customary international law. . . .84

Some scholars have likewise concluded that some or all of the exceptions violate customary international law85—and many within the U.S. executive branch
share this assessment.86
Because the terrorism amendments are a relatively new feature of the legal
landscape, the reporters for Third Restatement did not have to wrestle with
them.87 The Fourth Restatement generally downplays the controversy associated
with these amendments, either declining to address their consistency with international law or omitting references to protests by other governments and negative assessments by scholars.88 At a minimum, the Restatement ought to have
acknowledged more directly the contested status of the terrorism amendments.89

84 Communiqué of the Coordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Movement in rejection of unilateral actions by the United States in contravention of international law, in particular the principle of
State immunity, reproduced in U.N. Doc. A/70/861-S/2016/420 (May 6, 2016). For other examples,
e.g., Kristina Daugirdas & Julian Davis Mortenson, Congress Overrides Obama’s Veto to Pass Justice
Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, 111 Am. J. Int’l L. 156 (2017) (cataloging responses of foreign
governments to JASTA’s enactment); Beth Stephens, The Fourth Restatement, International Law, and
the “Terrorism” Exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, in this volume.
85 Rosanne van Alebeek, The Immunity of States and Their Officials in International
Criminal Law and International Human Rights Law 355 (2008) (“This study asserts that
the terrorist exception to the FSIA causes the United States to violate its obligations under international law. . . . The entertainment of claims against ‘rogue’ states for payment of damages suffered
as a result of human rights violations and terrorist acts is illegal under international law.”); Paul B.
Stephan, Sovereign Immunity and the International Court of Justice: The State System Triumphant, in
Foreign Affairs Litigation in United States Courts 67, 78–82 (John Norton Moore ed., 2013)
(explaining reasons to doubt the consistency with international law of the terrorism exception as
codified in 2008).
86 Ashley Deeks, Statutory International Law, 57 Va. J. Int’l L. 263, 280 (2018) (“Many, including
the executive branch, believe that the [terrorism] exception violates the rule of international law that
immunizes states from being sued in each other’s courts for their sovereign acts.”).
87 For the drafters of the Third Restatement, foreign sovereign immunity was quite straightforward. As Louis Henkin put it during the deliberations of the American Law Institute, “[i]t is my impression that there are no serious substantive issues about sovereign immunity. There is a statute.” 58
ALI Proc. 255, 256 (1981).
88 Austen Parrish makes this same critique with respect to the Fourth Restatement’s treatment
of adjudicatory jurisdiction. Austen Parrish, Adjudicatory Jurisdiction and Public International
Law: The Fourth Restatement’s New Approach, in this volume.
89 Unlike the final published version of the Fourth Restatement, the reporters’ first draft of the
chapter on the immunity of states from jurisdiction did acknowledge the contested status of
28 U.S.C. § 1605A. See Restatement of the Law Fourth, The Foreign Relations Law of the United
States: Sovereign Immunity § 460 reporters’ note 1 (Preliminary Draft No. 1, Sept. 13, 2013) (including the following text: “Some suggest that by denying immunity to state sponsors of terrorism,
the United States may have gone beyond what the international law of sovereign immunity permits.”).
This acknowledgment disappeared in the first Council Draft, which was circulated one year later. See
Restatement of the Law Fourth, The Foreign Relations Law of the United States: Sovereign Immunity
37–39 § 460 reporters’ notes 1–10 (Council Draft No. 1, Sept. 29, 2014).
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More broadly, the Fourth Restatement missed an opportunity to contribute to the rule of law by addressing more comprehensively the terrorism
exceptions’ consistency with international law. Such a contribution could provide useful guidance to judges, who must interpret the terrorism amendments,
and to members of Congress, who face persistent efforts to enact additional
amendments. Such guidance would be especially useful because—
perhaps
surprisingly—the U.S. executive branch has remained steadfastly silent about
this issue, at least in public.
By way of background, the initial version of the terrorism exception was
enacted as part of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)
in 1996.90 It permitted lawsuits against states that had been designated sponsors
of terrorism:
in which money damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury
or death that was caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of material support or resources . . . for
such an act if such act or provision of material support is engaged in by an official, employee, or agent of such foreign state while acting within the scope of his
or her office, employment, or agency. . . .

Since 1996, Congress has repeatedly legislated to expand on that initial terrorism
exception. Some of these provisions made it easier for plaintiffs to win such suits
on the merits or expanded the damages they could seek; other provisions were
designed to facilitate enforcement of judgments.91 Many of these enactments
were narrowly targeted to aid particular plaintiffs. To cite just one example, in
1997, the requirement that both the claimant and the victim be U.S. nationals
was modified so that only one or the other had to be a U.S. national.92 The House
Report indicates this change was made to allow lawsuits brought by families
of individuals who were killed when Pan Am 103 exploded over Lockerbie,
Scotland.93 Some of the victims were aliens whose close family members were
U.S. nationals, so they couldn’t satisfy the nationality requirement in the terrorism exception as originally enacted.
Remarkably, in many cases these amendments were adopted over the strenuous objections of the executive branch. In 1994, when Congress was considering
90

(7).

Pub. L. No. 104-132 (1996). The terrorism exception was initially codified as 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)

91 See, e.g., Sean Murphy, Satisfaction of U.S. Judgments Against State Sponsors of Terrorism, 94 Am.
J. Int’l L. 117 (2000); Sean Murphy, 2002 Victims of Terrorism Law, 97 Am. J. Int’l L. 187 (2003);
Stephens, supra note 84.
92 An Act to make a technical correction to title 28, United States Code, relating to jurisdiction for
lawsuits against terrorist states, Pub. L. No. 105-11, 111 Stat. 22 (1997).
93 H.R. Rep. No. 105-48; Stephens, supra note 84.
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creating a terrorism exception to the FSIA, officials from the State and Justice
Departments made a range of arguments against such an amendment.94 They
pointed out that Congress’s expansion of courts’ jurisdiction reflected a departure from the practice of other states regarding foreign sovereign immunity,95
and warned that this divergence from state practice could erode the credibility
of the FSIA as a whole and undermine foreign states’ willingness to defend other
lawsuits that the FSIA permits.96 Furthermore, the State Department maintained
that the terrorism exception could interfere with the United States’ calibration
of sanctions against state sponsors of terrorism and its ability to develop joint
positions with other nations regarding acts of terrorism.97 Finally, the State
Department observed there was a risk that other states would expand the jurisdiction of their own courts to reach acts of alleged wrongdoing by foreign
states—and would do so in a way that would potentially harm the United States.98
These objections did not sway many members of Congress. In the end, AEDPA
included many provisions that President Bill Clinton had specifically requested
Congress to enact.99 And so, notwithstanding the administration’s objections
to the terrorism exception, Clinton not only signed AEDPA but hailed its enactment as “an important step forward in the Federal Government’s continuing
efforts to combat terrorism.”100
On two subsequent occasions, legislation expanding the terrorism exception
generated presidential vetoes. In 2007, Congress included language in that year’s
National Defense Authorization Act to expand the original terrorism exception
along multiple dimensions, including by expressly creating a cause of action and
allowing the recovery of punitive damages. President George W. Bush vetoed
that legislation and secured an exception for Iraq in a subsequent version of the
bill, which he signed in 2008.101 The other expansions of the terrorism exception the 2007 legislation had contained were enacted and codified in 28 U.S.C.
Section 1605A. In 2016, Congress overrode President Barack Obama’s veto to
enact the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA).102 JASTA allows
94 The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: Hearing on S. 825 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and
Administrative Practice of the Judiciary Comm., 103d Cong. (1994).
95 Id. at 13–14 (prepared statement of Jamison S. Borek) (“We are not aware of any instance in
which a state permits jurisdiction over such tortious conduct of a foreign state without territorial
limitations.”).
96 Id. at 14.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 15.
99 Pub. L. No. 104-32 (1996).
100 Statement of President William J. Clinton on Signing S. 1965, 32 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 719
(Apr. 29, 1996).
101 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. 110-81, Jan. 28, 2008, 122
Stat. 338.
102 Kristina Daugirdas & Julian Davis Mortenson, Congress Overrides Obama’s Veto to Pass Justice
Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, 111 Am. J. Int’l L. 156 (2017).
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Americans to sue foreign states for playing a role in terrorist attacks on U.S. soil.
While the statute is written in general terms, it was drafted specifically to allow
families of the victims of the 9/11 attacks to sue Saudi Arabia for its suspected
role in those attacks. In his veto message, President Obama expressed concern
that JASTA would “reduce the effectiveness of our response to indications that a
foreign government has taken steps outside our borders to provide support for
terrorism, by taking such matters out of the hands of national security and foreign policy professionals and placing them in the hands of private litigants and
courts”; would “upset longstanding international principles regarding sovereign
immunity”; and “threatens to create complications in our relationship with even
our closest partners.”103 Notably, these objections were not framed in terms of international legal obligations governing foreign sovereign immunity.104
To analyze the consistency of the terrorism exceptions with international law,
it is necessary to draw some distinctions among them. The basic objection is that
any kind of “terrorism exception” is inconsistent with the restrictive theory of
sovereign immunity, pursuant to which foreign sovereigns maintain immunity
from adjudicative jurisdiction for their sovereign acts (but not their commercial
acts).105 The ICJ recently affirmed that this immunity subsists even for serious
human rights violations.106 Exceptions like JASTA that address events on the territory of the United States may be easier to justify: numerous states and the U.N.
Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Properties recognize exceptions to sovereign immunity with respect to some territorial torts.107
By contrast, terrorism exceptions that permit enforcement against foreign states
are generally harder to justify because customary international law requires
more robust protections with respect to exercises of enforcement jurisdiction.108
A key motivation for the U.S. executive branch’s silence is to avoid supplying
ammunition to challenge or critique the United States to foreign states adversely affected by the provisions in the event they are enacted into law.109 An
unequivocal public statement that proposed legislation expanding the terrorism

103

Id. at 159.
When asked directly whether JASTA violates international law, the White House press secretary sidestepped the question. Id. at 161.
105 The analysis for different terrorism exceptions will vary in the particulars. For example, foreign
sovereign immunity from enforcement is generally considered broader than foreign sovereign immunity from adjudication. In addition, there is support in state practice for an exception to foreign
sovereign immunity for territorial torts.
106 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. Rep. 99, ¶ 88 (Feb. 3).
107 Id. ¶¶ 64–79; United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their
Properties art. 12, Dec. 2, 2004, 44 I.L.M. 803 (not yet in force).
108 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, supra note 106, ¶ 113.
109 Hazel Fox & Philippa Webb, The Law of State Immunity 285 (3d rev. ed. 2015) (noting
the “consequences of disregarding the rules of state immunity” include “potential liabilities of the US
before international tribunals”).
104
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exceptions violates international law could become a liability once that legislation is actually enacted. Other states could cite it as a definitive concession that
the United States has violated its international obligations.
This concern is not merely hypothetical. In 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court
rejected Iran’s challenges to a legislative provision that was designed to help certain plaintiffs who had obtained default judgments against Iran to enforce them
against assets held in New York on behalf of the Central Bank of Iran.110 Iran subsequently initiated proceedings against the United States before the International
Court of Justice based on the dispute resolution provision of the 1955 Treaty of
Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights between Iran and the United
States. Iran argued that this bilateral treaty incorporates customary international
law rules regarding foreign sovereign immunity, and therefore confers jurisdiction to decide whether the United States had violated those customary international law obligations. Ultimately, the ICJ concluded that the treaty did not
supply such jurisdiction.111
The Fourth Restatement’s discussion of foreign sovereign immunity offers
little indication that the terrorism exceptions are widely—albeit not universally—
viewed as contrary to international law. The Fourth Restatement begins with a
statement that addresses both international law and U.S. law regarding adjudicative jurisdiction: Under both sources of law, “a state is immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of another state, subject to certain exceptions.”112 This
formulation leaves open the question of whether those exceptions align. Section
460 describes Section 1605A. A reporters’ note observes that the United States
was the first country to enact a terrorism exception, that Canada followed some
years later, and that the U.N. Convention on Jurisdictional Immunity of States
and Their Property “neither endorses nor precludes the removal of immunity
for acts of state-sponsored terrorism.”113 Strikingly, the Fourth Restatement
omits any mention of scholarship or protests by foreign governments charging
that these exceptions violate international law. Instead, the Fourth Restatement
adduces reasons to doubt a violation: “Given its focus on injuries to U.S. nationals
resulting from acts that have been condemned as illegal by the international
community, and the frequently repeated exhortation that states should provide relief and means of compensating victims of terrorism, it is not clear that
Section 1605A contravenes any presumptive jurisdictional constraint under
110 Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310 (2016); see also Kristina Daugirdas & Julian Davis
Mortenson, U.S. Supreme Court Upholds Law Facilitating Compensation for Victims of Iranian
Terrorism, 110 Am. J. Int’l L. 555 (2016); Pamela K. Bookman & David Noll, Ad Hoc Procedure, 92
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 767, 816–23 (2017) (describing the background of the contested provision).
111 Certain Iranian Assets (Islamic Republic of Iran v. U.S.), Preliminary Objections, Feb. 13,
2019, ¶ 80.
112 Fourth Restatement § 451.
113 Id. § 460 reporters’ note 11.
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international law.”114 The Fourth Restatement describes JASTA in a reporters’
note, but says nothing at all about how it aligns with international law.115 When
it comes to enforcement jurisdiction, the Fourth Restatement acknowledges that
customary international law imposes some limits but does not describe them,
and does not address whether the terrorism exceptions regarding enforcement
align with customary international law.116
The Fourth Restatement could have made a valuable contribution by saying
more about whether and how the various terrorism exceptions align with customary international law. Judges sometimes turn to customary international
law to interpret the FSIA,117 but they need help ascertaining the content of those
rules. Legislators too are often swayed by arguments that proposed legislation
would contravene international law118—but they can only be swayed by such
arguments if they know what international law requires.
Separately, keeping in mind the educational role of the Restatements of
Foreign Relations Law and the importance of “showing” as well as “telling” how
to work with customary international law, the Fourth Restatement could have
illustrated how to assess evidence for (or against) a given rule of customary international law. There is little doubt that American litigators and judges would benefit from such demonstrations. Ryan Scoville has demonstrated in an empirical
study of U.S. judicial opinions that American judges rarely undertake rigorous
and comprehensive analyses before pronouncing rules of customary international law.119 Moreover, it is quite likely that Congress will continue to legislate
additional terrorism exceptions, and that foreign governments will continue to
protest those expansions. American judges and legislators would benefit from
an illustration of how to interpret those protests and what significance to assign
to them.
Finally, to the extent that the Fourth’s Restatement assessment of Section
1605A rests in part on the absence of clear statements by foreign governments
that they believe customary international law requires foreign sovereign
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Id.
Id. reporters’ note 9.
116 Id. § 464 & reporters’ notes 10 & 16.
117 Id. § 451 reporters’ note 2 (citing examples of courts’ use of international law to help interpret
the FSIA).
118 See generally Deeks, supra note 86; Kevin Cope, Congress’s International Legal Discourse, 113
Mich. L. Rev. 115 (2015).
119 Ryan M. Scoville, Finding Customary International Law, 101 Iowa L. Rev. 1893 (2016). As it
turns out, American judges are hardly alone along this dimension: international courts and tribunals
rarely undertake such analyses either. Stephen J. Choi & Mitu Gulati, Customary International
Law: How Do Courts Do It?, in Custom’s Future 117 (Curtis A. Bradley ed., 2016); Stefan Talmon,
Determining Customary Int’l Law: The ICJ’s Methodology Between Induction, Deduction, and
Assertion, 26 Eur. J. Int’l L. 417 (2015) (finding that, “in a majority of cases, the ICJ has not examined the practice and opinio juris of states but, instead, has simply asserted the rules that it applies.”).
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immunity for terrorist acts, a statement to that effect may have spurred precisely
such statements. In turn, such statements would contribute to the clarification of
customary international law on this topic.

III. Architecture of the International Legal System
While the Third Restatement aimed for comprehensive coverage of foreign relations law, the Fourth Restatement has, so far, tackled only a limited
set of topics. Two topics ought to be a priority for future installments of the
Fourth: International responsibility and the evolution of customary international law over time. Addressing these topics would educate American lawyers
and judges about the basic architecture of the international legal system. Even
today, many, and perhaps most, practitioners have had very limited exposure to
international law. No State bar exam tests international law, and international law
is not part of the Federal Judicial Center’s curriculum for new federal judges.120
Because it addresses only selected topics, the Fourth Restatement periodically
touches on international responsibility but does not address it systematically.
For example, the reporters’ note following Section 401, which sets out the three
categories of jurisdiction, explains that “if a state exercises jurisdiction beyond
the limits of international law, the state in question will violate international law,
and such a violation will entail international responsibility.”121 This note cites the
International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on State Responsibility, but does
not go on to elaborate what international responsibility entails. As another example, a comment in a subsequent section explains: “If Congress were to violate
international law governing jurisdiction to prescribe, the United States would
not be relieved of its obligations under international law or of the consequences
of a violation of those obligations.”122
Systematically addressing the law of international responsibility is
important—and even urgent—in light of the developments described in Part
I. In recent years the United States’ legal system has become more dualist, and
there are some indications that in future years it may move further in this direction. The more insulated U.S. law becomes from international law, the greater the
risk of international responsibility. Judges and lawyers ought to understand these
risks so that they can make deliberate decision about how to handle them. Judges
have various tools at their disposal that they can deploy to better understand the

120 John Coyle, The Case for Writing International Law into the US Code, 56 B.C. L. Rev. 433, 468
(2015).
121 Fourth Restatement § 401 reporters’ note 1.
122 Id. § 406 cmt. b.
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international legal consequences of their decisions. They might seek the views of
the executive branch. Alternatively, or in addition, judges might take additional
steps to discern the content of rules of international law to more precisely ascertain the risk of breach, or what is needed to avoid one.123
Moreover, the law of international responsibility is “ripe” for inclusion in
future installments of the Fourth Restatement because its contents are largely
settled since the International Law Commission completed its work on state responsibility in 2001. The draft articles the Commission produced are increasingly accepted and cited as reflecting customary international law.124 At the time
that the Third Restatement was being developed and published, the Commission
had not yet figured out how it would handle a number of controversial issues.125
The Third Restatement addresses responsibility mainly in Part IX, which is
captioned Remedies in International Law. This part briefly addresses “defenses,”
or what the Commission referred to as “circumstances precluding wrongfulness”;126 obligations to cease wrongful conduct and make reparation;127 and the
possibility that a state that is a victim of a breach may take countermeasures.128
One issue that merits attention in a future installment of the Fourth
Restatement is attribution. Section 207 of the Third Restatement addresses attribution of conduct to States, providing: “A state is responsible for any violation of its obligations under international law resulting from action or inaction
by . . . any organ, agency, official, employee or other agent of a government or of
any political subdivision, acting within the scope of authority or under color of
such authority.”129 This remains an accurate statement of the law of international
responsibility, but judges who are unfamiliar with international law could easily
miss two points that merit emphasis, especially in the wake of the Medellín and
Bond decisions. First, the acts and omissions of the individual U.S. States are attributable to the United States as a matter of international law. A reporters’ note
states: “The United States has consistently accepted international responsibility
for actions or omissions of its constituent States and has insisted upon similar

123 See, e.g., Scoville, supra note 119, at 1947 (noting that courts can deploy Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 44.1 to gather additional evidence of practice and opinio juris).
124 See, e.g., Report of the Secretary-General, Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful
Acts: Compilation of Decisions of International Courts, Tribunals, and Other Bodies, U.N. Doc. A/
71/80 (2016).
125 See generally Alain Pellet, The ILC’s Articles on State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful
Acts and Related Texts, in The Law of International Responsibility 75, 84 (James Crawford,
Alain Pellet, & Simon Olleson eds., 2010) (noting that, even by 1996, nearly a decade after the Third
Restatement was published, the Commission had not yet resolved a number of controversial issues,
including the notion of State international crime, countermeasures, and settlement of disputes).
126 Third Restatement § 901 cmt. a & reporters’ note 1.
127 Id. § 901.
128 Id. § 905.
129 Id. § 207.
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responsibility on the part of the national governments of other federal states.”
The problem is the implication that this is a discretionary, and perhaps idiosyncratic, position on the part of the United States. A second point that warrants
emphasis is that decisions of individual U.S. courts are likewise attributable to
the United States.
Separately, future installments of the Fourth Restatement ought to explain in
general terms how rules of customary international law may change over time.
On this topic, the Third Restatement offers no information at all. The Fourth
Restatement, once again, includes some scattered notes about the evolution of
customary international law. Thus, a reporters’ note observes: “National legislation, executive action, and the decisions of national courts on jurisdiction
represent forms of state practice and may contribute to the development and
interpretation of customary international law on jurisdiction if done out of a
sense of legal right or obligation.”130 Systematic discussion of how customary international law evolves over time would, among other things, help judges and
legislators understand how to cope with new developments relating to the terrorism exceptions of the FSIA. Supplementing the Fourth Restatement in this
way would have another positive effect: It would extend its shelf life, preserving
the Fourth Restatement’s utility over the decades to come as both international
law and U.S. law will continue to shift.

IV. Conclusion
Promoting the rule of law is not exactly a straightforward task. All three of the
Restatements of Foreign Relations Law have advanced this goal in various ways.
There remains room for future installments of the Fourth Restatement to further
advance this goal.

130

Fourth Restatement § 401 reporters’ note 1.

